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Thirty years after it was enacted, ERISA 1 jurisprudence
is, in several important respects, in a sorry state. For
example, in the fall of 2004, when James Wooten's book
first crossed my desk, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California dismissed a complaint in an
employee benefits case that garnered depressingly little
attention even in ERISA circles. The facts do not appear to
have been terribly complicated, although the defendant's
course of conduct is a bit hard to fathom. 2 Louis Goeres was

t Professor of Law, Boston University. E-mail: mhylton@bu.edu.
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§
1001-1461 (2000).
2. Goeres v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., No. C04-01917 CRB, 2004 WL
2203474, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2004) was decided on the defendants' motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In evaluating the defendants' motion, the court is obligated
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the beneficiary of a Schwab Plan Retirement Savings and
Investment Plan. He had been so designated by his
deceased domestic partner, Stephen Ward, who had been a
Schwab employee and plan participant. Mr. Ward died in
December 1999. Goeres informed Schwab's human
resources department of Mr. Ward's death in January 2000.
Goeres was asked to submit a death certificate, which he
did. When Goeres contacted Schwab again in January or
February of 2000 he was told that he was not a named
beneficiary on Mr. Ward's account. In May 2001, Schwab
representatives contacted Goeres and said that he was, in
fact, the named beneficiary on Ward's account. Schwab then
sent Goeres an application for plan benefits. Goeres claims
that the materials he was sent failed to inform him of his
distribution options as a non-spouse beneficiary.
The practical
problem presented by Schwab's
unexplained delay was that Ward's account was valued at
about $1.2 million in December 1999, about the time he
died. By the time Goeres collected the contents of the
retirement plan in 2004 it was valued at approximately
$565,000-or less than 50% of the account's value at the
time of Ward's death. The gist of Goeres' claim was that he
received substantially less money than he would have had
Schwab promptly notified him of his beneficiary status and
his benefit distribution options. His loss, he argued, was in3
excess of $500,000 and was the direct result of Schwab's
breach of the fiduciary duty it owed him as a plan
beneficiary. 4

to accept as true all material allegations in the complaint as well as the
reasonable inferences drawn from them. Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d
556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987).
3. Plaintiff named three defendants: Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. (employer),
Schwab Retirement Plan Services (plan) and the Administrative Committee of
the Schwab Plan Retirement Savings and Investment Plan (administrator).
Goeres, 2004 WL 2203474, at *1.
4. Plaintiff alleged that all three defendants were fiduciaries of the ERISA
retirement plan, and all three breached their fiduciary duties by failing to
timely notify plaintiff of his plan beneficiary status and distribution options.
Plaintiff claimed to seek equitable relief pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)
(2005) in seeking a modification of the retirement plan's records to reflect
plaintiffs entitlement to a distribution of Ward's retirement account as of a date
no later than June 30, 2000.
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Following a line of cases that has been troubling from
the first, 5 the district court dismissed Goeres' complaint.
Noting that the relief Goeres sought was legal and not6
equitable and citing the well-known decisions in Mertens
and Great West, 7 the court noted that:
[m]oney damages, the [Knudson] Court explained, is the classic
form of legal relief.

. .

. A court order modifying the Retirement

Plan records to reflect that plaintiff was entitled to a distribution
of benefits no later than June 30, 2000 would be meaningless
unless it meant that defendants must pay plaintiff the value of the
account on that date. Thus, what plaintiff is actually seeking is his
monetary damages arising from 8defendants' failure to timely
notify him of his beneficiary status.

And, even though the absence of monetary relief meant
there was no adequate remedy for what appeared 9 to have
been a straightforward instance of breach of fiduciary duty,
the court reiterated what is fast becoming a sorry mantra in
ERISA jurisprudence: legal relief-i.e., money damages-is
not available under ERISA section 1132(a)(3) even where
there is no other make-whole remedy.

5. See generally Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204
(2002); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985). These cases demonstrate the Supreme Court's
increasingly narrow read of ERISA's civil enforcement provision contained in 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). The Court has interpreted ERISA's authorization of

"appropriate equitable relief' to exclude monetary relief while transplanting the
traditional, pre-1938 division between law and equity into ERISA remedy law.
The combination of this interpretation with ERISA's broad preemption
provision has led the federal courts to preclude remedy in several instances
where a fiduciary's wrongful conduct has caused measurable harm. For an

excellent critique of the Court's interpretation of "appropriate equitable relief,"
see John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable":The Supreme Court's
Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317
(2003).

6. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 248.
7. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 204.
8. Goeres, 2004 WL 2203474, at *3 (citation omitted).
9. Since the case was decided on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepted
as true all material allegations in the complaint. Id. at *2.
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Goeres and the many other recent cases like it1O are
remarkable after Mertens and Great West, both for the
persistence of the ERISA plaintiff's bar in trying to find
ways to obtain make-whole relief in egregious cases and for
the continued refusal of Congress to amend ERISA to
provide adequate make-whole remedies."1 A patently unjust

10. See Peralta v. Hispanic Bus., Inc., 419 F.3d 1064, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005)
(declaring reliance damages unavailable to injured plaintiff left uninformed
that company's long-term disability benefits had been discontinued shortly
before automobile accident); Calhoon v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 400 F.3d 593
(8th Cir. 2005) (declaring restitution of medical bills for injured wife and
children unavailable to plaintiff unaware that health coverage was cancelled,
because employer sent payment coupons to plaintiffs former address); Ramsey
v. Formica Corp., 398 F.3d 421, 425 (6th Cir. 2005) (denying plaintiffs' request
for temporary restraining order to enjoin employer from reducing pension plan
payments after years of overpayment); Callery v. U.S. Life Ins. Co. in City of
N.Y., 392 F.3d 401, 405-06 (10th Cir. 2004) (declaring reliance damages
unavailable to plaintiff whose employer failed to notify her that spouse's life
insurance was terminated upon divorce); Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
368 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2004) (declaring backpay unavailable for plaintiffs
terminated by employer to prevent plaintiffs from attaining eligibility in
employee benefit plans); Helfrich v. PNC Bank, Ky., Inc., 267 F.3d 477, 480 (6th
Cir. 2001) (barring plaintiff from recouping "significant economic loss" as a
result of plan administrator's failure to rollover plaintiffs 401(k) assets into
mutual funds plaintiff had specified); Bast v. Prudential Ins. Corp. of Am., 150
F. 3d 1003 (9th Cir. 1998) (barring recovery where plan administrator's delay in
authorizing particular medical treatment allowed cancer to metastasize from
lung to brain, killing participant); Forbes v. Cemex, No. Civ.A. 1:03CV67-R,
2005 WL 1801923 (W.D. Ky. July 28, 2005) (barring plaintiffs recovery of
insurance proceeds left unpaid due to prior discontinuation of group life
insurance plan and failure to notify plaintiffs husband of opportunity to convert
to individual life insurance plan); Kyro v. Gen. Prods. Corp., No. 04-74145, 2005
WL 1802088, at *1 (E.D. Mich. July 28, 2005) (declaring reliance damages
unavailable to plaintiff whose husband did not convert life insurance plan as
required, but whose employer had been paying premiums for years due to
"clerical error"); Gonzalez Villanueva v. Warner Lambert, 339 F. Supp. 2d 351
(D.P.R. 2004) (denying recovery of lost salaries resulting from employer's denial
of long term disability benefits and eventual termination of sick plaintiff);
Estate of Mattern v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 241 F. Supp. 2d 540 (D. Md. 2003)
(barring plaintiffs from recouping $41,000 in capital gains taxes that could have
been avoided had employer rolled over plan funds to deceased participant's
husband before husband also died).
11. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (supporting the "rising judicial chorus urging that Congress and
[this] Court revisit what is an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA regime")
(quoting DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453 (3d Cir. 2003));
Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) (Calabresi, J., dissenting in part)
("[The injury that the courts have done to ERISA will not be healed until the
Supreme Court reconsiders the existence of consequential damages under the
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and inefficient legal regime continues to replicate itself
again and again. Conduct that clearly constitutes breach of
fiduciary duty, negligent plan administration or worse, and
which causes significant financial loss, pain and suffering,
or other harm often cannot be remedied under ERISA.
preemption provisions preclude relief
(And, ERISA's broad
12
in the state courts.)
How, thirty years after the statute's enactment, did we
end up in this situation? This question was one I hoped
James Wooten's well-written and thorough political history
could help answer. The book does not disappoint, although
it leaves the careful reader less than sanguine about the
prospects for reforming ERISA. Wooten's political history is
extremely valuable for its detail and description of the long
process that culminated in ERISA. It offers few clues,
however, to how ERISA plaintiffs (like Goeres) might
extricate themselves from this present state of affairs.
I. THE MODEST ROLE OF "SPECIAL INTERESTS"
Wooten's project is an ambitious one-to make the
counterintuitive argument about the non-dominant role of
''special interests" in the development of major social
statute, or Congress revisits the law to the same end."), vacated sub nom. Vytra
Healthcare v. Cicio, 124 S. Ct. 2902 (2004); L. Darnell Weeden, ERISA's

Preemption Ruling Prevents a Patient from Suing an HMO Under State
Malpractice Law: After Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila Who Will Grant the

Working Middle Class a Meaningful Right to Be Heard?,7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 715, 745 (2005) (urging passage of Patients' Bill of Rights Law to "wipe out
the vast regulatory vacuum created by ERISA's . . . preemption rationales");

Kelly M. Loud, Comment, ERISA Preemptionand Patients'Rights in the Wake
of Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 54 CATH U. L. REV. 1039, 1070-75 (2005) (urging
passage of federal legislation providing patients with right to independent
medical review). The Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 2004, introduced in June
2004, was intended to strengthen claims review procedures and amend ERISA
by introducing a cause of action against health plan fiduciaries for "fail[ure] to
exercise ordinary care in making a decision." H.R. 4628, 108th Cong. § 402
(2004). The bill never became law.
12. ERISA preempts all state laws "insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000). The Supreme
Court has recognized ERISA's preemption clause to be "broad" and "expansive."
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987). ERISA's savings clause,
however, saves any state law that "regulates insurance." § 1144(b)(2)(A); see Ky.
Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 334 (2003); Rush Prudential
HMO, Inc. v, Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 366 (2002); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S.
52, 61 (1990).
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legislation, namely ERISA. He demonstrates how a strong
legislative drive for worker pension security-a component
of employee welfare-came to dominate the process that
resulted in the statute we live with today. Portions of the
book are especially helpful to the ERISA neophyte who
wants to understand the basic project that is ERISA and to
evaluate how the statute has performed in light of its own
objectives. On a general conceptual level, Congress was
trying to devise a system that would protect workers from
both default risk 13 and forfeiture risk. 14 Many of the
statute's best known features-vesting rules, 15 funding
rules, 16 accrual rules, 17 the creation of the Pension Benefit
5
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)' L-were
designed explicitly
to address one or both of these risks. However, Wooten
argues, this did not happen as a result of "special interests"
in spite of the popular view that "special interests" are
invariably the key players in whether and how new
legislation comes to life. Wooten notes that although
organized labor was divided and many business groups
opposed pension reform on the grounds that it would be
onerous and costly,
[t]he historical record is clear. Government officials wanted to
regulate pension plans because they believed it was the right thing
to do. In published statements and private communications,
officials in the executive branch and Congress repeatedly appealed

13. Default risk is simply the risk that a plan may lack adequate assets in
the future to meet its financial obligations to participants. Even a casual reader
of the business pages is aware that ERISA has not completely eliminated
default risk for defined benefit plans in the United States. See Daniel Altman,
Enron's Collapse: The Pensions; Bush Promises a Look at Employee Risks, but
Experts Say Solutions Won't Be Easy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2002, at C4; GE
Reveals $5.25-Billion Pension Loss, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003, § 3, at 4; Panel to
Investigate Polaroid Retirement Payments, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, at C4;
Mary Williams Walsh, Pension Law Loopholes Helped United Hide Its Troubles,
N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2005, at Cl; WorldCom's Pension Plan Draws Warning,

L.A. TIMES, July 26, 2003, § 3, at 3.
14. Forfeiture risk is the risk that a plan participant will lose the ability to
collect a pension because of job loss, layoff, job change, or other conduct which
bars the participant from satisfying plan age or years of service requirements.
15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1053 (2000).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1085 (2000).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (2000).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000).
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to a normative conception of the purposes pension plans should
serve....
Their conduct only makes sense as an expression of their
19
values.

Wooten makes a persuasive case for a more than thirtyyear-old process that appears, indeed, to have been
dominated by figures who pressed for this historic
legislation without regard to personal gain. That this seems
so astonishing early in the twenty-first century is probably
indicative of a level of pervasive cynicism about the
legislative process that the key players in Wooten's
narrative would have been unable to imagine. The use of
possibly misleading data by ERISA proponents and the
importance of the well-known failure of the Studebaker
Corporation's pension plan 20 are part of the story, as is the
development of distinct roles for the Labor Department and
the IRS. It is a story that seems to contain about as many
compromises as one would expect given the need to address
many, disparate concerns-the taxation of plans, the needs
of younger versus older workers, the costs to be borne by
plan administrators (i.e., the business community), the
mechanics of plan insurance, single versus multi-employer
plans, and preemption. In some cases, also not surprising,
legislators appear to have had an inkling of the trouble that
certain provisions of the statute might create in the future.
With respect to preemption, for example, which has
absorbed a substantial amount of federal and state court
time and attention in the last two decades, 21 Wooten
19. JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF

1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 8 (2004).
20. See Michael Allen, The Studebaker Incident and Its Influence on the
Private Pension Plan Reform Movement, in PENSION & EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW

68-73 (John H. Langbein & Bruce A. Wolk eds., 3d ed. 2000); Jeffrey A. Brauch,
The Danger of Ignoring Plain Meaning: Individual Relief for Breach of
Fiduciary Duty Under ERISA, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1233, 1238 (1995)

(acknowledging significance of 1963 Studebaker plant closing in ERISA's
passage).
21. See Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 342 (2003)

(holding that to "regulate insurance" and be saved from ERISA preemption,
state law must (1) be specifically directed toward insurance entities and (2)
substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and the

insured); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 140 (1990) (holding
that ERISA preempts state law claim for unlawful discharge to prevent
attainment of benefits under ERISA plan); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52,
64-65 (1990) (holding that ERISA preempts state laws relating to self-funded
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describes an eerily prescient exchange in which concern was
expressed that "[a] federal law which preempts only
particular aspects of pension and welfare plans . .. will
leave a two-fold effect: (1) states will seek out legislation
aspects not specifically preempted, and (2) endless litigation
a particular aspect
will emerge from disputes over whether
'22
has, or has not, been preempted.
No one seems to have anticipated that this now all-toofamiliar drama would play itself out in the welfare plan
arena, 23 but it is clear that the broad ERISA preemption
provision bequeathed by the statute was intended as such.
As a political history, Wooten's book makes for
interesting, detailed, and, at times, passionate reading. His
characterization of ERISA, however, as representative of a
shift in thinking about federal pension policy-i.e., from
pensions as a tool for managing employees to a workersecurity model-left me wondering about the large body of
ERISA plans, because such plans fall within ERISA's "deemer clause"); Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (explaining that ERISA's
preemption provision is "broad" and "expansive"); Levine v. United Healthcare
Corp., 402 F.3d 156, 166 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that ERISA preempts New
Jersey collateral source law that applies to both insurance and non-insurance
entities); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v. Sanders, 138 F.3d 1347, 1355-56
(11th Cir. 1998) (holding that ERISA preempts Alabama rule of civil procedure);
Stillmunkes v. Hy-Vee Employee Benefit Plan and Trust, 127 F.3d 767, 770 (8th
Cir. 1997) (holding that ERISA's "deemer clause" exempts self-funded plan from
Iowa subrogation laws); Haw. Mgmt. Alliance Ass'n v. Ins. Comm'r, 100 P.3d
952, 959 (Haw. 2004) (holding that ERISA does not preempt Hawaii's Patient's
Bill of Rights and Responsibilities Act, because Act "regulates insurance").
22. WOOTEN, supra note 19, at 265.
23. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2501 (2004) (upholding
ERISA preemption as a ground for removal); Wirth v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare,
137 F. App'x 455, 459 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding plaintiffs state claims completely
preempted by ERISA and holding that federal district court, after removal, had
subject matter jurisdiction); Levine v. United Healthcare Corp., 402 F.3d 156,
163 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that state law claims to recover reimbursement paid
to insurers are essentially claims for "benefits due," and are accordingly
preempted by ERISA) (citing Arana v. Ochsner, 338 F.3d 433, 438 (5th Cir.
2003); Kuthy v. Mansheim, 124 F. App'x 756, 757 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding
proper the removal of plaintiffs claim for failure of HMO to authorize necessary
bone marrow transplant for cancer patient); Land v. Cigna Healthcare of Fla.,
381 F.3d 1274, 1276 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding plaintiffs state law malpractice
claims against HMO completely preempted by ERISA and removable to federal
court); DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 449 (3d Cir. 2003)
(affirming federal district court's exercise of removal jurisdiction over plaintiffs
claim against HMO for negligent interference with doctor's decision to insert
tracheostomy tube).
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common law that has repeatedly defended the absence of
vesting and other standards for welfare plans on the ground
that employers need complete freedom and flexibility to
design plans for the purpose of attracting and retaining
employees. If Congress' work on ERISA represents a shift
in the government's view of pension policy, there is scant
evidence that it has permeated that of the federal courts or
the employer community. Wooten notes that ERISA has
had a major impact on the provision of healthcare in the
United States at a time when the industry was itself
undergoing dramatic changes. However, ERISA provides
few substantive protections to health and disability plan
participants and their beneficiaries, and state court actions
are often preempted. The "regulatory vacuum" 24 that
Wooten describes is huge and presents a serious problem
for thousands of workers every year. He suggests that
ERISA's political history implies "that, without the threat
of conflicting state laws, employers and unions that sponsor
multistate health plans will oppose initiatives to create
federal minimum standards for health plans or expand the
liability of such plans. '25 This sounds like a "special
interests" model at work to keep the "worker security"
model from being completely realized.
There is general agreement that much pre-ERISA
systematic forfeiture risk has indeed been eliminated as
Congress hoped. 26 Also, the evidence with respect to default
risk is that ERISA has been largely successful in spite of

24. WOOTEN, supra note 19, at 272.

25. Id.
26. The vesting rate (the percentage of the entire population with at least
some entitlement to an employer's contributions) increased overall from 24% in
1979 to 41% by 1998. The participant vesting rate (the percentage of all
participants at least partially vested in a retirement plan) rose from 52% in
1979 to 93% in 1998, cutting across workers in different sectors and of both
sexes. Much of this improvement can be credited to the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
which mandated 100% vesting for all employees by the end of their fifth year of
employment with the plan sponsor. Employee Benefits Research Institute,
EBRI Data Book on Employee Benefits, ch. 10, tbl 10.5 (4th ed. 2005), http://
0
www.ebri.org/pdf/publicationslbooks/databook/DB.Chapter%2 10.pdf.
In addition, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
greatly enhanced pension portability, allowing workers to transfer their
retirement savings from one employer's plan to another's or to an Individual
Retirement Account (IRA).
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the prominent failures of the past few years. 27 Of course,
Congress does not appear to have anticipated the dramatic
decline in the number of defined benefit plans 28 and the
simultaneous explosion of defined contribution 29 plans. One
view of this change is that plan sponsors, seeking a degree
of protection from certain ERISA provisions, 30 have
abandoned defined benefit plans, and the insurance 31 that
accompanies them, in search of lower cost and less
regulated options. Wooten also suggests that "It]he decline
of qualified defined-benefit plans likely owes something to
the fact that the corporate officers who select compensation
stand to gain much from such a [definedprograms do not
32
benefit] plan."
Many have commented on this shift from pensions in
which the plan bears the risk of investment performance to
plans in which this risk is borne by participants. 33 Wooten

27. The number of total PBGC plan terminations fell from 28,572 during
1975-1979 to 6969 during 2000-2004. These numbers reflect both voluntary and
involuntary (PBGC-initiated) plan terminations. CORP. POLICY & RESEARCH
DEP'T., PENSION BENEFIT GuAR. CORP, PENSION INSURANCE DATA BOOK 2004, at
28 (2005) [hereinafter PENSION], available at http://www.pbgc.gov/docs/2004

databook.pdf.
28. Defined benefit plans are those pension plans under which employers
promise employees a fixed level of retirement income determined by a formula,
typically dependent on the employee's years of service and level of
compensation.
29. Defined contribution plans are distinguished from defined benefit plans
in that employers do not promise any fixed level of retirement income. Rather,
the employer contributes to each employee's individual account in the plan, and
the value of this account at retirement determines the employee's retirement
benefit.
30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1085 (2000) (establishing rates at which employers
must fund plans to ensure that there are assets sufficient to meet benefit
obligations); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1322(a) (2000) (relating to plan termination, but
does not apply to defined contribution plans).
31. A desirable consequence of abandoning a defined benefit plan in favor of
a defined contribution plan is the cost savings to the employer that comes with
no longer having to pay PBGC premiums. In 1974, the flat-rate premium per
participant for single-employer plans was $1.00. In 1986, that figure reached
$8.50. By the mid-1990s, it had grown to $19.00 per participant. PENSION, supra
note 27, at 62.
32. WOOTEN, supra note 19, at 279.
33. See id. at 278 n.32.
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hints that there is evidence that suggests that ERISA itself
34
is at least partially responsible for this change.
What is lacking in the discussion is an explicit
acknowledgement of the important role that cost plays in
virtually every plan design decision.
II. SOME ECONOMICS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
As Wooten notes at several points, ERISA, although
primarily focused on pensions, also applies to a wide range
of non-pension welfare benefits, including many long- and
short-term disability plans, and many health insurance
plans. 35 One important feature of all ERISA regulated plans
is that they are non-mandatory-i.e., offered at the
discretion of the plan sponsor who is often an employer.
While there is reasonably well-developed literature on the
economics of employee benefits, 36 most legal academics pay
little attention to it with predictable consequences.
Consistent with this approach, Wooten, whose attachment
to the notion that "special interests" in the political science
sense were not critical to the core ERISA story is
unwavering, and fails to address in a systematic way the
central role of cost, paternalism, and worker preferences in
both pre-ERISA and post-ERISA regimes.
For example, as the current crisis in healthcare
and workers'
coverage 37 suggests, cost
insurance
34. "In part, the shift toward defined-contribution plans is the result of
changes in federal law. ERISA created new regulatory standards for definedbenefit and defined-contribution plans, but the funding rules and insurance
program affect only defined-benefit plans. Later revisions of ERISA's protective
policies ... further increased the cost difference between defined-benefit and
defined-contribution plans." Id. at 278.
35. An ERISA-governed plan generally requires the following: (1)
identification of the intended benefits, (2) identification of the intended
beneficiaries, (3) a source of financing, and (4) a procedure for obtaining
benefits. Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1373 (11th Cir. 1982).
36. A good starting point and personal favorite of mine is Lawrence H.
Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON. REV.
177 (1989). See also Gail A. Jensen et al., Cost Sharing and the Changing
Pattern of Employer-Sponsored Health Benefits, 65 MILBANK Q. 521 (1987);
Deborah Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and
Economic Theory, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1275 (1991).
37. The number of individuals without health insurance in the United
States rose to 45.8 million in 2004, constituting 15.7% of the population.
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preferences are crucial to understanding the problem and,
presumably, to crafting a solution. Wooten notes that
changes in the labor market, principally the decline in
union density rates, have "reinforced the effects of the
federal law. ' 38 This is an important issue that cries out for
additional attention. The link between unionization and39the
presence of, for example, health insurance is strong. If
Congress was indeed motivated by a worker security model
when it enacted ERISA, why has that model failed to
surface in other areas of federal law? Why, for instance, has
Congress resisted most of organized labor's legislative
agenda for the past three decades, even though much of
that agenda was designed to facilitate the organizing of
employees? 40 In other words, to the extent that union
penetration is a proxy for the provision of pension and
health insurance benefits, why did the worker security
model fail to extend itself to federal labor law?
The absence of a coherent economic framework makes it
hard to understand and accept the notion that worker
security ruled the day in the early 1970s and then gave way
to the post-ERISA landscape we currently inhabit. One
cannot understand the behavior of plan sponsors or
participants without focusing on the crucial role that cost
containment and flexibility play. On the welfare plan side,
plan sponsor devotion to ERISA preemption is primarily a
function of the need to preserve future flexibility with
respect to cost control. As Wooten notes, welfare plan
benefits generally do not vest-i.e., they do not become the
property of plan participants in the way pension benefits
do. The absence of vesting means an employer that has
decided to offer health or disability insurance in the current
year can reduce or eliminate altogether those benefits in a

CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU POPULATION REPORTS:
INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE U.S. 16 (2004),

available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p60-229.pdf. Many of those
uninsured are working people or the dependents of working people.
38. WOOTEN, supra note 19, at 279.
39. See Karen Seccombe & Cheryl Amey, Playing by the Rules and Losing:
Health Insurance and the Working Poor, 36 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 168, 176
(1995).
40. The Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act of 2003 was the
last attempt on Capitol Hill to require unionization of police officers and
firefighters post-9/11. The bill never become law. See S.606, 108th Cong. (2003).
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future year. In fact, as health insurance premiums have
soared 41 recently, many employers have sharply reduced
benefits, increased premiums, or dropped coverage entirely.
The health insurance crisis is a story about costsspecifically who can and will bear them and for how long.
Employers that can contribute toward coverage today may
not be certain of that ability tomorrow. ERISA's regulatory
vacuum for welfare plans has repeatedly been cited by
courts as beneficial to employer flexibility. 42 It is also a
story about worker preferences, for as workers face
increasing costs in their share of premiums, many choose to
go without insurance. The problem with this expressed
employee preference is that some percentage of the time
employees incorrectly evaluate the likelihood that they will
need medical care. This negative adverse selection has
serious consequences for public hospitals and other
institutions that often step into the breach.
The post-ERISA pension story is also one that is driven
by cost considerations. Defined benefit plans force plan
sponsors to bear the risk that the plan may not have
sufficient assets to satisfy its financial obligations as
employees retire. Defined benefit plans and the insurance

41. See Rob Kaiser, Health Premiums Soar; Annual Cost to Insure a Family
Almost 60% Higher Than in 2001, Study Finds, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 10, 2004, at
C1.
42. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2499 (2004) ('The
limited remedies available under ERISA are an inherent part of the 'careful
balancing' between ensuring fair and prompt enforcement of rights under a plan
and the encouragement of the creation of such plans.") (citation omitted); Varity
Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) ("[C]ourts may have to take account of
competing congressional purposes, such as Congress' desire to offer employees
enhanced protection . . . and . . . its desire not to create a system that is so
complex that administrative costs . . . unduly discourage employers from

offering welfare benefit plans in the first place."); Graham v. Balcor Co., 146
F.3d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998) ("With ERISA preemption, Congress sought to
encourage the formation of employee benefit plans by standardizing the
regulatory requirements applicable to plan administrators."); McGann v. H & H
Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 407 (5th Cir. 1991) ('Congress evidenced its
recognition of the need for flexibility in rejecting the automatic vesting of
welfare plans .... [U]nstable variables prevent accurate predictions of future
needs and costs."' (quoting Moore v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 492 (2d
Cir. 1988)); Forbes v. Cemex, No. Civ.A.1:03CV67-R, 2005 WL 1801923, at *2
(W.D.Ky. July 28, 2005) ("ERISA preempts state laws that... 'bind employers
or plan administrators to particular choices or preclude uniform administrative
practice ....
"')
(citation omitted).
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program to protect them administered by the PBGC 4 3
contain a number of well-known and arguably perverse
incentives. 44 Defined contribution plans are consistent with
an increasingly unorganized workforce in which all of the
investment risk remains with employees who are presumed
competent to make private savings decisions. After all,
employees who do not need unions to mediate their work
experience can probably be counted on to appropriately
express their retirement preferences. If a participant makes
intelligent choices and saves consistently she ought to enjoy
a financially comfortable retirement. If she fails to save, or
makes poor choices, no insurance or other back up will
support her after she retires.
Thus, the non-mandatory benefits world is now
characterized by a strongly anti-paternalistic ethos.
Employers make the choices they feel are best (i.e., most
cost effective) for them, and employees do likewise. Benefits
are now explicitly a tool for attracting and retaining
employees. Wooten's worker security model, if it really
ruled the day thirty years ago, now lives a precarious
existence in the mandatory benefits arena. And, as the
ongoing debate over privatizing Social Security 45 (perhaps
43. See 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000).
44. The PBGC too often lacks lien priority status in employer bankruptcy
proceedings, arguably leaving employers less accountable to their employees
while shifting the burden of promised pension benefits to the PBGC. See Jill L.
Uylaki, Note, Promises Made, Promises Broken: Securing Defined Benefit
Pension Plan Income in the Wake of Employer Bankruptcy: Should We Rethink
Priority Status for the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation?6 ELDER L.J. 77,
91-96 (1998). Related to this issue is the moral hazard associated with PBGC
insurance and the perverse incentives encouraging withdrawal and plan
termination. See, e.g., Alicia H. Munnell, Guaranteeing Private Pension
Benefits: A Potentially Expensive Business, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., Mar.-Apr.
1982, at 24, 28-33; DAN M. MCGILL & DONALD S. GRUBBS, JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF
PRIVATE PENSIONS 584-85 (6th ed. 1989) (explaining incentives for employers to
terminate plans or not fund the maximum tax-deductible level, since,
"[c]ontrary to sound insurance principles, the insured event was largely under
the control of the plan sponsor").
45. President George W. Bush has proposed partial privatization of Social
Security through a transition to individual accounts. Under such a proposal, a
worker could divert a percentage of wages from the Federal Insurance
Contributions Act (FICA) and voluntarily place the funds into private accounts
for investment in stocks, bonds, or mutual funds. Debate rages over the wisdom
of subjecting workers' retirement income to market risks. See, e.g., Patricia E.
Dilley, Taking Public Rights Private: The Rhetoric and Reality of Social
Security Privatization, 41 B.C. L. REV. 975, 981 (2000) ("[A]dvocating
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the best known and most important mandatory employee
benefit) demonstrates, the appropriate role for cost
considerations and the anti-paternalistic model is up for
grabs.
In sum, the economics of federal pension and employee
benefits policy is mostly about cost shifting and retaining
flexibility in the face of future uncertainty. Where Wooten's
worker security model seems most applicable, however, is
with respect to Social Security. Although, as Professor
Weiss observed more than ten years ago, it applies to
private pensions as well:
The United States attempts to provide retirement income security
through two programs: Social Security and the system of tax
subsidies for retirement savings. Both of these mechanisms
display Congress' desire to protect people from the consequences of
their own actions by restricting individual choice .... Participation
in Social Security is compulsory. Thus, for the individual
contributor, the Social Security system is just like forced savings:
individuals are required to give up consumption now in return for
more consumption later .... The system of tax incentives also has
a paternalistic character, though of a more subtle kind. Unlike
Social Security, the tax system does not require individuals to
save. Rather, it encourages savings through subsidies. But
existing subsidies are intended to serve a paternalistic objective...
.[T]he Internal Revenue Code provides the highest ceilings on tax
deductions to those pension programs that46leave the least room for
individual choice regarding savings levels.

Wooten's claim that worker security more than "special
interests" informed the process that gave birth to ERISA is
problematic from a backward-looking standpoint. From the
vantage point of thirty years hence, worker security seems
to have little to do with ERISA. The preemption cases, the
privatization ... constitute[s] a step in the direction of eliminating middle class
retirement as a labor force management tool, substituting in its place an
economic old age lottery in which retirement would once again become a hope
rather than an expectation."); Richard L. Kaplan, Enron, Pension Policy, and
Social Security Privatization, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 83-85 (2004) (highlighting
incompetence of average American adult's portfolio management skills);
Kathryn L. Moore, PartialPrivatization of Social Security: Assessing Its Effect
on Women, Minorities, and Lower-Income Workers, 65 Mo. L. REV. 341 (2000)

(speculating on partial privatization's effects on women, minorities, and lowincome workers).
46. Deborah M. Weiss, PaternalisticPension Policy: Psychological Evidence
and Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1279-80 (1991).
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ongoing Goeres-type struggle to fashion make-whole
remedies, the record levels of employees without access to
health insurance coverage, and the shift from defined
benefit plans to defined contribution plans do not,
individually or collectively, tell a story in which Congress
struggles to achieve worker security. On the contrary, the
story is one about ever-shifting efforts to contain and shift
costs in the face of future unknowns. I suspect that Wooten
knows this disappointing post-ERISA landscape as well as
anyone. It would be enormously helpful to learn how we
moved from the worker security model to the current state
of affairs.
It is hard, for example, to see even a glimmer of worker
security in the remedy cases. The current cost-dominated
climate is in no way consistent with Wooten's description of
worker security in the early 1970s. Add to that the perverse
incentives created by ERISA in the remedy cases and the
reader is left wondering whether someone will write a book
that explains what happened to the worker security model
(and, possibly, how to revive it). Cases like Goeres are not
troubling simply because a plan participant or beneficiary
is left without a make whole remedy, although that is a
persistent and tragic hallmark of the Mertens and Great
West line of cases. Goeres and every case like it47 create an
incentive for plan sponsors and administrators to exercise
little or no care in their dealings with participants and
beneficiaries. 48 Again, the economics literature 49 on
damages and incentives is helpful here.

47. See cases cited supra note 10.
48. ERISA allows participants and beneficiaries to bring a civil action for a
breach of fiduciary duty, but the legal and equitable relief available in such an
action cannot be individualized. Rather, the relief sought must inure to the plan
as a whole. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109(a), 1132(a)(2) (2000); see also Mass. Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 141 (1985) ("[ERISA's] draftsmen were
primarily concerned with . . . remedies that would protect the entire plan,
rather than with the rights of an individual beneficiary."). Under § 1132(a)(3),
individuals may seek relief for violations of ERISA or the terms of the plan, but
this provision permits only "appropriate equitable relief," the Supreme Court
having narrowly interpreted this language to mean relief "typically available in
equity." Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993).
49. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:An Economic Approach, 76
J. POL. ECON. 169, 183 (1968) ("Although only the attitudes offenders have
toward risk can directly determine whether 'crime pays,' rational public policy
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In employee benefits, as in other areas of law such as
torts,5 0 antitrust, 51 and criminal law, 52 the central concern
in creating a penalty regime is to maximize participant and
beneficiary welfare without discouraging conduct, which is
in fact socially optimal. In other words, the goal of a
properly functioning system of penalties is to optimally
discourage undesirable conduct without discouraging
socially beneficial conduct. As Professor Langbein 53 has
noted (and Wooten appears to agree 54 ) ERISA is fundamentally federal trust law. (Many have noted the appropriation
of many key features of trust law by the drafters of
ERISA.) 55 The importance of this connection between trust
law and ERISA is that the law of trusts would have been
indirectly insures that 'crime does not pay' through its choice of [the probability
of conviction] and [the level of punishment].") (citation omitted).
50. See Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Costs and the Economic Theory of Tort
Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 111 (1991) (highlighting the failure of both strict
liability and negligence suits to internalize social costs of wrongdoing when
litigation is costly); Keith N. Hylton, Reply, Punitive Damages and the
Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421 (1998) (proposing a socially
optimal framework indicating when punitive awards should aim to internalize
victim's loss and when they should aim to eliminate tortfeasor's gain).
51. See Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency,
Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1032
(1987) (arguing that antitrust enforcement ought to give priority to advancing
efficiencies in innovation and production over allocative efficiency); John E.
Lopatka, The Case for Legal Enforcement of Price Fixing Agreements, 38 EMORY
L.J. 1, 48 (1989) ("[A]n inefficient cartel may not be deterred and... an efficient
cartel may set output below the proper level if antitrust penalties are suboptimal.").
52. See Becker, supra note 49, at 170.
53. Langbein, supra note 5, at 1319 ("Congress made a deliberate choice to
subject [ERISA] plans to the pre-existing regime of trust law rather than to
invent a new regulatory structure.").
54. See generally WOOTEN, supra note 19, at 97.
55. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2000) ("assets of an employee benefit plan
shall be held in trust"); Cent. States v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 571-72
(1985) (drawing an analogy between the duty ERISA imposes on fiduciaries to
notify all participants and beneficiaries of their status and rights under the
plan and the duty of common-law trustees to notify beneficiaries of gifts made
to them); H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 11 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4639, 4649 ("The fiduciary responsibility section, in essence, codifies and makes
applicable to these fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of
the law of trusts."); Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental
Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1988)
(discussing the complexities of importing a duty of loyalty from private trust
law into pension law).

1210

BUFFALO LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 53

extremely hostile to the now commonplace result for many
ERISA plaintiffs: physical or financial harm caused by a
plan with no make-whole remedy available. Relying on
law/equity distinctions that Congress may not have
intended to resurrect 56 "[t]he Supreme Court's mishandling
of ERISA remedy law has rendered the protections of
ERISA illusory in any case in which the victim of ERISAproscribed wrongdoing needs damages for consequential
57
injury in order to be made whole."
This is a near-classic description of an underdeterrence
scenario-i.e., one in which, unfortunately, there is a
negative incentive for an ERISA plan to exercise the
optimal degree of care in its interactions with participants
and beneficiaries. The present ERISA remedy regime
makes it attractive for plans to behave in ways that harm
or may harm participants and others since there is no
mechanism by which the plan can be compelled to make its
victim whole should money damages (as is so often
necessary) be required. Additionally, the absence of
punitive damages, reserved in the field of torts, 58 for
example for outrageous conduct, means that even in

56. See Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 221-22
(2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I would ... [not] shackle an analysis of what
constitutes 'equitable relief under § 502(a)(3)(B) to the sort of historical
analysis that the Court has chosen."); id. at 225 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("It is
thus fanciful to attribute to members of the 93d Congress familiarity with those
'needless and obsolete distinctions,' [between law and equity] much less a
deliberate 'choice' to resurrect and import them wholesale into the modern
regulatory scheme laid out in ERISA.") (quoting 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1041, at 131 (2d ed.

1987)); Health Cost Controls of Ill. v. Washington, 187 F.3d 703, 711 (7th Cir.
1999) ("There is nothing to suggest that ERISA's drafters wanted to embed
their work in a time warp.").
57. Langbein, supra note 5, at 1362.
58. At common law, punitive damages have long been awarded "where the
injury has been wanton and malicious, or gross and outrageous." Day v.
Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1852). Such damages "hav[e] in view the
enormity of [the] offence rather than the measure of compensation." Id. In
Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34-35 (7th Cir. 1996), Chief Judge Posner
reviewed a number of reasons for awarding punitive damages. These reasons
include ensuring that tortious conduct not be underdeterred, ensuring that
individuals channel transactions through a legitimate market, relieving
pressure on the criminal justice system, punishing for undetected violations
where such risk exists, allowing the community to translate its abhorrence into
a monetary award, and even allowing an alternative to violent self-help. Id.
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extreme situations both money damages and the extraordi59
nary sanction of a punitive penalty are unavailable.
Assuming that the public will slowly educate itself
about this state of affairs, it may be that the political
process will result in an amendment to ERISA that would
explicitly reject the present law/equity distinction as a basis
for crafting appropriate remedies. In the meantime, we can
only hope that Congress' historical focus on worker security
and not on "special interests" in the field of employee
benefits will reassert itself and hasten much needed reform.
III. ERISA AND INNOVATION
The state of ERISA remedy law may be shameful and
ERISA may have failed to anticipate and prepare for the
shifts in healthcare and from defined benefit to defined
contribution plans. However, the statute has clearly
succeeded in certain respects. The elimination of most
forfeiture risk and default risk from the traditional pension
system is a prime example. Thus, on its own albeit modest
terms the statute has achieved Congress' principal aims.
Wooten also makes a larger claim for the statute thoughthat the much maligned preemption and remedial
provisions in fact encouraged innovation in the health care
arena. I found this curious at first until I understood that
he was describing the other side of the appallingly weak
damages regime described above.

59. The federal courts have declared punitive and other "extracontractual"
damages (those damages compensating for anything other than benefits due)
unavailable under ERISA's civil enforcement provision, offering only the court's
condolences in the most egregious violations. See Bast v. Prudential Ins. Corp.
of Am., 150 F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 1998) (plan administrator's delay of
almost six months in authorizing bone marrow transplant allowed cancer to
metastasize into brain making participant ineligible for transplant and
resulting in participant's death); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F. 2d
1321, 1322-24 (5th Cir. 1992) (ignoring the warnings of employee's doctor as
well as those of an independent medical consultant, employer twice denied
pregnant employee temporary disability benefits, resulting in a shortened
hospital stay and death of the fetus); Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984
F. Supp. 49, 50-53 (D. Mass. 1997) (while doctors at several hospitals, and even
the courts of Massachusetts, had determined that suicidal beneficiary required
thirty-day alcohol detoxification and rehabilitation program specifically covered
by plan, plan refused on three occasions to authorize more than eight days of
treatment, and beneficiary eventually committed suicide with beer in hand).
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Wooten points to utilization review and other now
common managed care tools as examples of innovations
that might not have developed but for the protections
ERISA afforded plans. 60 He describes a common scenario in
which
courts understandably interpreted ERISA to preempt state law
remedies against utilization reviewers. Often the only meaningful
remedy available to a plan participant was to sue for medical
benefits due under the plan. Yet, as many observers have noted,
this limited remedy left health plans with little or no incentive
(besides reputation) to approve benefit claims. The worst that
could happen if a plan denied a claim was that the participant
would bring a lawsuit and
force the plan to pay the claim (and,
61
perhaps, attorneys' fees).

I am not certain what the final verdict will be on the
desirability of utilization review and other tools of managed
care. A health care system built on second guessing
decisions of physicians and other providers by insurance
company employees may not be ideal; on the other hand, we
are all familiar with the unchecked costs associated with
fee for service arrangements.
It is clear though that Wooten believes that plans take
advantage (i.e., "innovate") when they think they will be
largely insulated from the consequences of their actions.
Wooten is correct that this innovation might, from time to
time, be a good thing. However, Wooten implicitly credits
the economic approach to penalties and deterrence when he
notes that the plan had little incentive to improve claims.
This is also an implicit admission that the worker security
model, whatever its life in Congress, did not manage to take
hold in the plan sponsor community.
CONCLUSION

ERISA is thirty years old-no longer a new statute with
lots of provisions in need of interpretation by the federal
courts. In many important respects the congressional effort
that resulted in the passage of ERISA in 1974 must be
lauded for substantially reducing the likelihood that an
60. WOOTEN,

61. Id.

supra note 19, at 283.
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employee will reach retirement age and discover that his
employer does not have the promised funds to pay in
retirement. The statute also, via its funding, accrual, and
vesting provisions, eliminated most forfeiture risk in
defined benefit plans.
The workplace and employee benefits have changed
tremendously over the past three decades. Neither
Congress nor anyone else seems to have anticipated the
huge social shifts in healthcare, the dramatic decline of
union density, and the triumph of defined contribution
plans over defined benefit plans. Wooten tells his readers to
put aside the political science model of "special interests"
dominated legislation when thinking about ERISA, and he
makes a strong case for his alternative, a worker security
vision that informed this important effort. As even a
cursory review of current ERISA jurisprudence suggests,
"special interests," specifically self interest and cost
avoidance, now dominate every aspect of pension and
welfare plan administration and litigation. The only
coherent method for making sense of the present situation
is to work in economics and other areas of law that focus on
remedies and incentives.

